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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE

While the nature of this case is more fully and clearly evident from the Statement of Facts
herein, in simply terms this is a legal malpractice case brought by the disabled beneficiary of an
attorney's estate planning client, which beneficiary was deprived of property as a result of a deed
knowingly prepared by the attorney in the course of probating the beneficiary's mother's estate.
In the words of the District Court, "Mr. Wise breached his duty to Billy Jr. by preparing the 2012
Deed for Brent Kyser, and in so doing, frustrating Carolyn's intent as expressed in her Will.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

1.

The Complaint in this matter was filed on August 28, 2017 by David Kalb, acting

in the capacity of Conservator of Billy Kyser, Jr., an incapacitated person. R. at 13 and 554,
Finding 46.
2.

Defendant Craig Wise, a legal professional, filed his Answer on October 20,

2017. R. at 23.
3.

The parties unsuccessfully engaged in court ordered mediation on August 31,

2018 with retired District Judge Steven Verby. R. at 31.
4.

Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on November 8, 2018. R. at 43.

5.

Defendant's Answer to Plaintiffs Amended Complaint was filed on January 25,

2019. R. at 126.
6.

Defendant filed a motion to summary judgment on November 9, 2018. R. at 59.
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7.

Plaintiff filed his opposition to summary judgment on December 5, 2018 and the

parties presented oral argument on Defendant's motion for summary judgment on December 19,
2018. R. at 76 and 116.
8.

The District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment was entered January 18, 2019. R. at 116.
9.

A bench trial commended February 26, 2019. R. at 7.

10.

The District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Court Trial on

May 17, 2019, finding among other things that "Mr. Wise breached his duty to Billy Jr. by
preparing the 2012 Deed for Brent Kyser, and in so doing, frustrating Carolyn's intent as
expressed in her Will." R. at 542 and 566.
11.

The District Court also issued its Judgment in favor of Plaintiff on May 17, 2019.

R. at 577.

12.

Defendant Craig Wise filed his Notice of Appeal on May 22, 2019. R. at 579.

13.

The District Court's Order Staying Execution and Enforcement of Judgment was

entered May 24, 2019. R. at 8.
14.

Plaintiff filed a Memorandum of Costs on May 28, 2019. R. at 9.

15.

Defendant filed an objection to Plaintiffs Memorandum of Costs on June 11,

2019. Id.
16.

Plaintiff filed a Reply regarding the Memorandum of Costs on June 14, 2019. Id.

C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

Plaintiff/Respondent Billy Kyser, Jr. ("Billy Jr.") is

but functions

nowhere near that age level. His mental development plateaued when he was starting out in
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grade school, and that is more or less the level at which he is functioning today. At the peak of
Billy Jr.'s competency, his reading comprehension was at the 4th or 5th grade level. His mental
capacity declined gradually in his 20s and 30s. His reading comprehension is now down to the
2nd grade level. His capacity to retain what he has read has also dropped. R. at 545, Finding 5.
2.

Billy Jr. has speech problems. He was born with a cleft palate and has undergone

numerous surgeries attempting to correct it. He can move and walk, but has a very low mental
capacity. R. at 545, Finding 4.
3.

David Kalb is Billy Jr.' s conservator and uncle, and the brother of Billy's father,

Bill Kyser, Sr. R. at 545, Finding 1 and 2.
4.

David Kalb has known Billy Jr. since he was a baby. R. at 545, Finding 2.

5.

Bill Kyser, Sr. ("Bill Sr.") and Carolyn Kyser ("Carolyn") were married on

August 3, 1968, and they had two children, Billy Jr. and Brent Kyser. R. at 545, Finding 3.
6.

Bill Sr. and Carolyn divorced on February 16, 2001. Id.

7.

Before Bill Sr. and Carolyn divorced, Billy Jr. lived with his parents. After their

divorce, Billy Jr. lived for about two years with his father. He then lived exclusively with his
mother until her death. R. at 546, Finding 6.
8.

Billy Jr. currently resides with his caregivers Terri and Wendell Kuntz, in Osburn,

Idaho. R. at 546, Finding 7.
9.

At all times relevant to these proceedings, Defendant/Appellant Craig Wise ("Mr.

Wise") was an Idaho licensed attorney in active practice.

He obtained his law license on

September 21, 1979. His practice was located in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. He practiced throughout
Idaho's First Judicial District and was known as a general practitioner. R. at 546, Finding 8.
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10.

Mr. Wise, on behalf of Carolyn, drafted and filed the Complaint for Divorce in

Kootenai County Case CV-2000-7734. R. at 546, Finding 10.
11.

At the time of the divorce, Billy Jr. and his brother Brent were adults, and the

Complaint for Divorce provided: "There have been no children born of this marriage that are at
the present time under age 18 years old." R. at 546, Finding 11.
12.

The Complaint for Divorce, which Mr. Wise prepared, included the following

provision regarding personal property of Billy Jr., who was then in his 30s:
[T]hat the Court affirm that the following items of personal property in the
possession of Defendant belong to son Billy Kyser, Jr., and should be
affirmed in these proceedings, consisting of dresser, two beds, storage unit
and contents, 2 end tables, TV table, clothing and personal effects, and
Laz Boy Chair (all above items in Billy Jr's bedroom), aluminum boat and
electric motor, and CD player and CD's in motorhome.
R. at 546-547, Finding 12.
13.

Bill Sr. did not timely respond to the Complaint for Divorce. As a result, a decree

was entered against him by default. Mr. Wise drafted that Decree of Divorce which included the
Complaint's provision regarding the disposition of Billy Jr.' s personal property. R. at 54 7,
Finding 13.
14.

The Decree of Divorce entered in Kootenai County Case CV-2000-7734 was

subsequently set aside as to the division of property and debts, which matters were later
determined in Bonner County Case CV-2001-1046. R. at 547, Finding 14.
15.

Mr. Wise continued his representation of Carolyn regarding the division of

property in Bonner County Case CV-2001-1046. Id.
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16.

In a letter dated November 28, 2001, by Mr. Wise to Bill Sr.'s attorney Paul

Vogel, Mr. Wise again made reference to Billy Jr.' s personal property described in the
Complaint for Divorce, to-wit:
In the meantime, my client has a proposal to settle the remaining divorce
issues - property and debts - as follows: my client would keep all
property in her possession, and you client would keep all property in his
possession, except for the marble top table, dining room buffet/table, and
oak hutch, as well as all of Billy's items identified in the Complaint.
R. at 547, Finding 15.
17.

On February 15, 2002, Bill Sr. and Carolyn executed a Property Settlement

Agreement before a notary public. The Property Settlement Agreement included a distribution
of the items of Billy Jr.' s personal property identified in the Complaint for Divorce and Mr.
Wise's November 28, 2001 letter. R. at 548, Finding 16.
18.

Mr. Wise drafted the Judgment in Bonner County Case CV-2001-1046, which

resolved the property division and debt allocation issues attendant to the divorce. A copy of the
Property Settlement Agreement was attached thereto. R. at 548, Finding 18.
19.

The Property Settlement Agreement set forth the general manner in which Bill Sr.

and Carolyn wished to devise their real property and mobile home:
As to the real property and mobile home, the parties agree to execute a
Deed granting to Husband a life estate in and to said property. If any of
the following conditions come into existence, the real property and mobile
home shall go to Wife with her receiving a life estate with the same
conditions being required of Wife as of Husband, whereafter the property
shall go to the Husband and Wife's children (remainder interest), Billy E.
Kyser, Jr. and Brent A Kyser.
R. at 548, Finding 19.
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20.

The "real property and mobile home" referenced in the Property Settlement

Agreement are the property at issue in this case. R. at 549, Finding 20.
21.

The subject property, which is located in Boundary County, Idaho, is commonly

known as 4107 Farm to Market Road, Bonners Ferry, Idaho 83805 (the "subject property"). R. at
549, Finding 21.
22.

Mr. Wise drafted the deed quitclaiming the subject property, as follows:
unto Bill E. Kyser, Sr., a life estate, and then to Carolyn A. Kyser, a life estate,
and then, to Brent Kyser, a married person dealing in his sole and separate
property, and Billy Kyser, Jr., an unmarried person, as tenants in common, as to
the remainder interest ...

(hereinafter "2002 Deed"). R. at 549, Finding 22.
23.

Mr. Wise also drafted for Carolyn her Last Will and Testament (hereinafter

"Will"). R. at 549, Finding 23.
24.

Mr. Wise prepared Carolyn's Will and the 2002 Deed during the same time

frame. R. at 550, Finding 25.
25.

Mr. Wise began the process of drafting the Will before the final draft of the 2002

Deed was executed. Id.
26.

It was Mr. Wise's standard practice when meeting with estate planning clients to

specifically advise them on things like life estate deeds. Trial Tr. at 213, In. 16 - 22.
27.

Carolyn specifically requested of Mr. Wise that the 2002 Deed provide for a

remainder interest to Billy Jr. Trial Tr. at 225 - 226.
28.

The 2002 Deed was executed by Bill Sr. and Carolyn before Notary Public Helen

Nystrom on March 28, 2002. R. at 549, Finding 22.
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29.

Carolyn executed her Will before Notary Public Craig R. Wise on March 29,

2002. R. at 549, Finding 23.
30.

Mr. Wise recorded the 2002 Deed m Boundary County on April 2, 2002

(Instrument No. 205524). R. at 549, Finding 22.
31. Carolyn's Will, as prepared by Mr. Wise, reads in pertinent part as follows:
I hereby devise and bequeath the entire of my estate to my children, Brent
Kyser and Billy E. Kyser, Jr., in equal shares ...
As to Billy E. Kyser, Jr.'s share of my estate, that portion of my estate shall
be held in trust for distribution to him on the following terms:
(a) Brent Kyser shall serve as trustee, with my friend, Terri Kuntz, to serve as
alternate trustee;
(b) The trustee shall retain possession of the respective portion of such
principal and income and accumulate the income therefrom, or pay over or apply
the whole or any part of such principal and income to said child, or for said
child's support, maintenance, welfare, and education, as the true sees fit, and in
the trustee's sole discretion; and
(c) That said trust shall not terminate until Billy's death, where at such
time the remaining principal and income shall be distributed to Brent Kyser or his
heirs.
R. at 549, Finding 24 (emphasis added).
32.

At the time Craig Wise drafted Carolyn's Will and the 2002 Deed, Mr. Wise

knew that Billy Jr. was an adult, was at least physically disabled, was unable to work, and lived
with his mother. Mr. Wise had also previously prepared the Complaint for Divorce, Decree of
Divorce, and November 28, 2001 letter to attorney Paul Vogel, all of which described or
referenced items of Billy Jr. 's personal property that were to be distributed to him. Yet, Mr.
Wise did not ask Carolyn for more elaboration on Billy Jr.'s condition. R. at 550, Finding 26.
33.

The trust provided for Billy Jr. in Carolyn's Will, by Mr. Wise, is a discretionary

trust, not a special needs trust. R. at 550, Finding 27.
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34.

Bill Sr. died in or about 2004. Upon his death, Carolyn had a life estate in the

subject property. R. at 550, Finding 28.
35.

Carolyn died on or about June 28, 2011. Upon her death the remainder interest in

and to the subject property vested in Brent and Billy Jr., as tenants in common. R. at 550,
Finding 29.
36.

On July 12, 2011, Mr. Wise, as attorney for personal representative Brent Kyser,

filed an "Application for Informal Probate of Will and Informal Appointment of Personal
Representative" in Kootenai County Case CV-2011-5575. R. at 550-551, Finding 30.
37.

Mr. Wise served as attorney of record for personal representative Brent Kyser in

Carolyn's probate case for over four (4) years from July 12, 2011 through July 27, 2015. R. at
550-551, Finding 32.
38.

In August 2012, Mr. Wise drafted, at Brent Kyser's request, a Quitclaim Deed

conveying Billy Jr. 's one-half remainder interest in the subject property to Brent Kyser, as
follows:
GRANTOR, Billy Kyser, Jr., an unmarried person, for good
consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged,
REMISE, RELEASE and forever QUITCLAIM unto Brent Kyser,
person, ... GRANTEE, and to grantee's heirs and assigns forever,
subject property].

and valuable
does hereby
an unmarried
all of ... [the

(hereinafter "2012 Deed"). R. at 551, Finding 33.
39.

Mr. Wise prepared the 2012 Deed for Brent as a side matter unrelated to the

probate case. Mr. Wise testified that: "I was requested on behalf of Brent Kyser separate and
apart from the estate to prepare the deed for his brother to sign conveying his interest to Brent."
R. at 551, Finding 34.
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40.

As he prepared the 2012 Deed, Mr. Wise recognized the real property being

conveyed as the same property that was conveyed in the 2002 Deed, in which Billy Jr. received a
remainder interest (i.e. the subject property). R. at 552, Finding 35.
41.

When he finished preparing the 2012 Deed, Mr. Wise, at Brent's request, mailed

it to Billy Jr. to be executed and included a transmittal letter. R. at 551, Finding 36.
42. Mr. Wise's transmittal letter to Billy Jr., dated August 24, 2012, provided as follows:
Re: Quitclaim Deed
Dear Billy:
I represent your brother, Brent Kyser, in legal matters, including the administration
of your mother's estate. You and your brother are now the owners of your parent's
property in Boundary County, located in Section 26, including the mobile home.
Brent desires that at this time you deed your interest in the property over to him. If
you agree, I have prepared a draft Quitclaim Deed for your review, enclosed. Please
review and sign before a notary public, and thereafter either return to me, or forward to
your brother.
Please contact me if you have any questions or comments.
Sincerely,
CRAIG R. WISE, P.A.
Craig R. Wise
Enclosures
cc: Brent Kyser
R. at 552, Finding 37 (emphasis added).
43.

Mr. Wise's letter to Billy Jr. did not advise Billy Jr. to obtain independent legal

counsel. R. at 552, Finding 38.

9

44.

Brent returned the executed 2012 Deed to Mr. Wise. Mr. Wise recorded the 2012

Deed in Boundary County on September 22, 2012 (Instrument No. 255120). R. at 552-553,
Finding 39.
45.

Craig Wise never had any discussions with Billy Jr., either after mailing him the

2012 Deed, or at any time. R. at 553, Finding 40.
46.

There was no consideration exchanged for the transfer of property effectuated by

the 2012 Deed. R. at 553, Finding 41.
47.

Since recordation of the 2012 Deed, Brent Kyser continues to hold title to the

subject property as his sole and separate property. R. at 553, Finding 42
48.

Billy Jr. 's only income is his social security disability benefits. R. at 554, Finding

II.
1.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Does the duty owed by an attorney to his client's intended beneficiaries under the

exception established in Harrigfeld and subsequent authority only extend to or encompass
"probate" assets?

III.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

The Respondent requests attorneys' fees pursuant to LC. § 12-121, since the duty
established under Harrigfeld has been long established and therefore Craig Wise's appeal has
been brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.

10

IV.

ARGUMENT

"The elements of a legal malpractice action are: (a) the existence of an attorney-client
relationship; (b) the existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (c) failure to perform the duty;
and (d) the negligence of the lawyer must have been a proximate cause of the damage to the
client." Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 136, 90 P.3d 884, 886 (2004).
"As a general rule, an attorney will be held liable for negligence only to his or her client
and not to someone with whom the attorney does not have an attorney-client relationship." Id. at
13 7. As an exception to the general rule, "an attorney preparing testamentary instruments owes a
duty to the beneficiaries named or identified therein to prepare such instruments, and if requested
by the testator to have them properly executed, so as to effectuate the testator's intent as
expressed in the testamentary instruments." Id. at 138. As this Court articulated in Soignier, an
"attorney must properly draft and execute the will and other instruments, but only to effectuate
the testator's intent as expressed within those documents." Soignier v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322,
325, 256 P.3d 730, 733 (201 l)(emphasis added).
A.

CRAIG WISE OWED BILLY JR. A DUTY TO BOTH PROPERLY DRAFT AND
EXECUTE CAROLYN'S WILL AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS.

The District Court did not expand the duty of care established in Harrigfeld as the
Appellant contends, but rather merely acknowledged that attorney Craig Wise's duty to Billy Jr.
grew out of his preparation of Carolyn's testamentary instrument (a will in this case), which duty
of care encompasses both (1) preparing the will and other instruments, and (2) having the will
and other instruments properly executed to effectuate Carolyn's intent as expressed in her Will.
See, Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 139, 90 P.3d 884, 889 (2004); Soignier v. Fletcher,
151 Idaho 322,325,256 P.3d 730,733 (2011). In this case, it is this second half of Mr. Wise's
11

duty to Billy Jr. that was breached and damaged Billy Jr.: his duty to properly execute the will
and other instruments. 1
That the District Court did not expand the duty of care established in Harrigfeld is first
evident from the District Court's perception of the question before it: "did Mr. Wise's
preparation of the 2012 Deed violate the duty he owed to Billy based upon his preparation of
Carolyn's Will?" R. at 560. The District Court both properly perceived the source of Mr. Wise's
duty as being Carolyn's Wills, and the scope of that duty, which was to effectuate Carolyn's
intent as evident from her Will.
The District Court's fidelity to the duty of care established in Harrigfeld is then evident
from the plain language of the District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order:
Accordingly, as the attorney who prepared Carolyn's Will, Mr.
Wise owed a duty to Billy, under Harrigfeld, to prepare the Will,
and have it properly executed, so as to effectuate Carolyn's intent
as expressed in the Will, which was to devise and bequeath the
entire of her estate to her children, Brent Kyser and Billy E. Kyser,
Jr., in equal shares; and to have Billy's share held in trust for
distribution to him for the duration of his life.
R. at 559 (emphasis in original). As such, both the source of Mr. Wise's duty to Billy, Jr. and
evidence of Carolyn's intent is her Last Will and Testament, but the scope of Mr. Wise's duty to
Billy Jr. goes beyond merely drafting the Will, and includes properly "executing" the will and
other instruments to effectuate Carolyn's intent. See, Soignier v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322, 325,
256 P.3d 730, 733 (2011).
1

In addressing Mr. Wise's affirmative defenses, the District Court did find that Mr. Wise breached his
duty to Billy Jr. in connection with preparing Carolyn's Will by failing to provide competent
representation and failing to make the minimum factual or legal inquiries necessary to understand the
implications of the discretionary trust he created, in contravention of the local standard of care and
I.R.P.C. 1.1. However, this specific breach was not the proximate cause of the damage suffered. R. at
573.
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While it may be self-evident, an attorney's duty to see that a testamentary instrument is
properly "executed" so as to effectuate a client's intent, means to "perform or complete" what
the client intended. Black's Law Dictionary 609 (8th ed. 2004). In this regard, it should be
remembered that an "executor" is "[ o]ne who performs or carries out some act." Black's Law
Dictionary 619 (8th ed. 2004). This fact was emphasized by expert witness Peter J. Grabicki on

cross-examination:
Q.
A.
Q.

A.

You talked about a rekindled duty. What is the
source of that rekindled duty? Is there a case?
I think the Hancock [sic] case stands for that.
So, under your reading of Hancock [sic] if
somebody prepares a will and 30 years later they're
representing the PR, they have an obligation to
make sure the property passes to the beneficiary as
set forth in the will?
Yeah, their obligation is to carry out the will, and
that's part of the probate process, executing the will.
That's why they used to call the personal
representative an executor.

Trial Tr. at 131-132 (emphasis added). Therefore, an attorney's duty to "properly execute" a
testamentary instrument as required under Harrigfeld encompasses those acts necessary to
perform or carry out the intent of the client, as expressed in the relevant testamentary
instrument(s).
The duty articled in Harrigfeld, and in this Court's subsequent opinion in Soignier, while
narrow, is not so narrow as to be limited to just drafting a "will" or executing a "will" as the
Appellant seems to content. Rather, as provided in Soignier, "[t]he attorney must properly draft
and execute the will and other instruments ... to effectuate the testator's intent as expressed
within those documents" Soignier v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322, 325, 256 P.3d 730, 733
(2011 )(emphasis added). An attorney's duty to property draft and execute "other instruments" is
13

also implicit in Harrigfeld. 2 Thus while a duty only arises from the preparation of a testamentary
instrument under Harrigfeld, the scope of an attorney's duty is not limited to just drafting and
executing a "will" but rather incudes drafting and executing those "other instrument" necessary
to effectuate the testator's intent as expressed in the will.
The host of "other instruments" making up an estate plan for which an attorney has a duty
of care to properly draft and execute may, as expert witness Peter J. Grabicki testified, "include a
will, ... revocable and irrevocable trust,... life insurance beneficiary designations, pay on death
designations on account, beneficiary designations on qualified retirement plans, and a whole
assortment of other things that make up the estate plan." Trial Tr. at 88, ln. 16-23. In this case,
as in common in estate planning, those "other instruments" of estate planning include Carolyn's
life estate deed (i.e. the 2002 Deed) leaving a remainder interest to Billy Jr.
For the above stated reasons, the District Court did not expand the duty of care
established in Harrigfeld, but merely acknowledged the source and scope of the duty of care
owed by an attorney to their client's intended beneficiaries.
B.

CRAIG WISE'S DUTY TO BILLY JR. IS NOT LIMITED TO "PROBATE" ASSETS.

The heart of Mr. Wise's argument on appeal is that the subject property was not a
"probate" asset or part of the "probate" estate and thus no duty exists with respect to the
disposition of the subject property. This argument should fail both as a matter of law and as a
matter of policy. An attorney's duty to a client's beneficiary under Harrigfeld is not limited to
"probate" assets, and no such limit has be articulated by this Court.

2

The Court's articulation of what cannot be considered in ascertaining a testator's intent implies that an
unrevoked "codicil, or other instrument" can also evidence a testator's intent. See, Harrigfeld v. Hancock,
140 Idaho 134, 138, 90 P.3d 884, 888 (2004).
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The Appellant contend that because Carolyn's Will is the only testamentary instrument at
issue in this case, and thus the source of the duty owed by Mr. Wise, only assets comprising the
"probate" estate are subject to the duty owed by Mr. Wise to Billy Jr. In this way, the Appellant
essential argues that an attorney doing estate planning work can ignore with impunity their
client's intent so long as the beneficiary is only deprived of a non-probate asset. This view
however was rejected by the District Court and expert witness Peter J. Grabicki, whom the
District Court cited with approval: "the 2012 deed is completely inconsistent with and frustrates
the testator's estate plan. It's taking away something from Billy without consideration that the
testator intended that he would have a half interest in." R. at 562 (emphasis added).
Contrary to Mr. Wise's representation on appeal, the District Court did not consider Billy
Jr. 's remainder interest in the subject property to be a "probate" asset or part of the "probate"
estate, but rather an asset that comprised part of Carolyn's "entire" estate; all of what was to be
disposed of according to her 2002 estate plan. R. at 564. Stated another way, based on the Will
and as further evidenced by the 2002 Deed contemporaneously prepared by Mr. Wise, it was
Carolyn's intent that all of her assets be disposed of according to her estate plan: (1) an equal
division of the remainder interest in the subject property by way of the 2002 Deed, and (2) an
equal division of her remaining assets by way of her Will. See, Id.
It is not the character of the asset that is determinative of whether a duty exists, but rather
the nature and purpose of the attorney-client relationship and the intended beneficiary of that
relationship. This seems clear from the Court's reasoning in Harrigfeld. In Harrigfeld, this
Court in reaching it conclusion reasoned that "[ o]ne of the main purposes for preparing
testamentary instruments is to provide for the transfer of property to those named in such
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instruments. The harm to those intended beneficiaries in the event of negligent preparation is
clearly foreseeable." Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 138, 90 P.3d 884, 888 (2004).
In this case, one of the main purposes for preparing the 2002 Deed was to provide for the
transfer of a one-half remainder interest in the subject property to Billy Jr. In other words, Billy
Jr. was an intended beneficiary of the 2002 Deed and one of the main purposes for preparing the
2002 Deed. This is reinforced by Craig Wise's trial testimony:
Q.

A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

And this deed that you drafted provides for a
remainder interest to Billy Kaiser, Jr. individually,
correct?
That's correct.
Is it your testimony that Caroline Kaiser specifically
asked for that?
Yes.
And that she asked for that to inure to the benefit of
Billy Kaiser, Jr. individually?
Yes.

Trial Tr. at 225-226.
In this case, there can be no question that Mr. Wise prepared Carolyn's Will and the 2002
Deed at the same time. R. at 550, Finding 25. There can be no question that Carolyn's Will and
the 2002 Deed together provided for the disposition of the "entire" of Carolyn's assets. R. at 559.
There can also be no question that Carolyn's disabled adult son, Billy Jr., was an intended thirdparty beneficiary of both her Will, and the 2002 Deed. Trial Exh. at 2 and 6; Trial Tr. at 225-226;
R. at 521 and 558-559. Finally, there can be no question as to Carolyn's intent as provided in her
Will and "further evidence[ d]" in the 2002 Deed, as found by the District Court:
"Her unambiguous intent from the four comers of the document is
to devise and bequeath the entire of her estate to Brent and Billy,
Jr. in equal share... [and] the equal division of the remainder
interest in the 2002 Deed between Brent and Billy in further
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evidence of Carolyn's intent that her assets should be divided
equally between her two sons upon her death."
R. at 564.
As a matter oflaw, this Court has not limited an attorney's duty to a client's beneficiary
under Harrigfeld to "probate" assets.

Rather, the nature and purpose of the attorney-client

relationship and the intended beneficiary of that relationship determine the duty owed by an
attorney to a client's intended beneficiaries under Harrigfeld.
As a matter of policy, the duty owed by Mr. Wise to Billy Jr. should not be limited to
"probate" assets. The reasoning of the Court in recognizing a duty in Harrigfeld, as it relates to
"testamentary instruments," is just as applicable to those "other instruments" used in estate
planning to effectuate the testator's intent like the 2002 Deed in this case, and just as applicable
to the non-probate assets of the testator disposed ofby those "other instruments."
Consistent with the reasoning in Harrigfeld, the intended beneficiary, Billy Jr., is clearly
identified in both the Will and 2002 Deed; the harm to Billy Jr. in the event of negligent
preparation of a divesting instrument like the 2012 Deed is clearly foreseeable; the connection
between Mr. Wise's preparation of the 2012 Deed and the harm to Billy Jr. is direct; there is
sufficient moral blame attached to Mr. Wise's knowing preparation of the 2012 Deed to impose
liability; imposing a duty may prevent future harm by creating an incentive to not negligently
prepare such divesting instruments like the 2012 Deed; finally, extending the duty to this degree
would not unduly increase the burden upon attorneys to use care when drafting divesting
instruments like the 2012 Deed, and insurance is readily available to cover such risk. See,
Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 138, 90 P.3d 884, 888 (2004).
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For the above reasons, an attorney's duty to a client's beneficiaries under Harrigfeld is
not limited to "probate" assets, but includes non-probate assets disposed of by those "other
instruments" used in estate planning to effectuate the intent of the testator.
C.

CRAIG WISE BREACHED HIS DUTY OF CARE TO BILLY JR.

The District Court found and the Appellant Craig Wise concedes that he owed a duty of
care, under Harringfeld and subsequent authority, to Carolyn's beneficiary Billy Jr. to both
properly draft and execute her Will and other instruments so as to effectuate her intent as
expressed in her Will. R. at 521 and 558-559. However, Mr. Wise mis-reads the District Court's
Memorandum Decision and Order in incorrectly asserting in his brief that the "district court
found Wise prepared Carolyn's will, and had it properly executed, so as to effectuate Carolyn's
intent as expressed in the will." App. Brief at 12. The District Court did not find that Mr. Wise
"properly" prepared or executed Carolyn's Will, or find that he effectuated her intent as
expressed in her Will.

In fact, it was Mr. Wise's improper preparation and execution of

Carolyn's Will and other instruments, and in particular his preparation of the 2012 Deed that
failed to effectuate Carolyn's intent, and proximately caused the damage suffered by Billy Jr.
Compare, App. Brief at 12, and R. at 564,566 and 573.
The Appellant's disconnect with the District Court's findings is evident from the plain
language of the District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order: "It is painfully obvious from
the facts of this case that in preparing the 2012 Deed, Mr. Wise was acting under a conflict of
interest." R. at 564. Necessarily, this was a breach of the applicable standard of care, and thus a
breach of his duty to Billy Jr. In reaching this conclusion, the District Court identified Carolyn's
intent, and then properly relied on expert testimony as to the applicable standard of care, and

18

relied on the Rules of Professional Conduct which are informative of the standard of care, in
finding that "Mr. Wise breached his duty to Billy Jr. by preparing the 2012 deed for Brent Kyser,
and in so doing, frustrated Carolyn's intent as expressed in her Will." R. at 566.
The District Court specifically found that Carolyn's intent, as expressed in her Will, "was
to devise and bequeath the entire of her estate to her children, Brent Kyser and Billy E. Kyser,
Jr., in equal share; and to have Billy's share held in trust for distribution to him for the duration
of his life." R. at 559 (emphasis in original and added). The District Court properly found that
Craig Wise did not effectuate Carolyn's above stated intent, and in so doing breach his duty to
Billy Jr.
While the 2002 Deed is not a "testamentary instrument" and its individual preparation
alone would not have create a duty to Billy Jr., neither does the preparation of the 2002 Deed,
under the facts of this case, become a black hole where Mr. Wise can ignore the intent of his
client Carolyn as expressed in her contemporaneously prepared Will. Stated another way, the
mere preparation of a non-testamentary instrument or other estate planning instrument at the
same time and in connection with the preparation of a Will does not defeat or avoid the duty an
attorney has to his client's intended beneficiaries arising from a contemporaneously preparation
testamentary instrument.
In this case, as is common, a life estate deed was used in connection with Carolyn's
broader estate planning efforts to give the entire of her estate to her children, Brent and Billy Jr.,
in equal shares. R. at 564. As the District Court notes, "Mr. Wise prepared the 2002 Deed and
Will." Id. It must also be remembered that the Will and 2002 Deed were drafted "during the
same time frame" and that Mr. Wise "began the process of drafting the Will before the final draft
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of the 2002 Deed was executed." R. at 550. What is more, it was Mr. Wise's standard practice
when meeting with estate planning clients to specifically advise them on things like life estate
deeds. Trial Tr. at 213, ln. 16 - 22. In this context, while the 2002 Deed is not to be looked to in
ascertaining Carolyn's testamentary intent, as the District Court observed "the equal division of
the remainder interest in the 2002 Deed between Brent and Billy is further evidence of Carolyn's
intent that her assets should be divided equally between her two sons upon her death." R. at 564
(emphasis added).
Finally, both Plaintiffs and Defendants' expert witnesses m this case agreed that
Carolyn's testamentary intent was "for her estate to be split equally between [her] two
children ... " R. at 561. It was also expert witness Peter J. Grabicki's view, which was cited
approvingly by the District Court, that the 2002 Deed and Will were prepared as part of
Carolyn's broader estate plan, and that Mr. Wise's "duty arose in 2002 when [he] was working
with the decedent on her estate plan, was working to develop the documents for her estate plan to
carry out her intent." R. at 562. As we well know now, those estate planning documents
included both the Will (a testamentary instrument), and the 2002 Deed (alone a non-testamentary
instrument). Based on the District Court's finding that Carolyn's intent was for her estate to be
split equally between her two children, and on the District Court's finding the Mr. Wise
"frustrated Carolyn's intent" by preparing the 2012 Deed, Mr. Wise breached his duty to Billy Jr.
R. at 566.
D.

CRAIG WISE BREACHED THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF CARE.

Contrary to the Appellant's contention, the District Court did not "conflate" the duty of
care and the standard of care in reaching it decision. Rather, the District Court acknowledged the
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duty owed to Billy Jr., by Mr. Wise, under Harrigfeld, and then properly relied on expert
testimony as to the applicable standard of care, and relied on the Rules of Professional Conduct
which are informative of the standard of care, all in finding that "Mr. Wise breached his duty to
Billy Jr. by preparing the 2012 deed for Brent Kyser, and in so doing, frustrated Carolyn's intent
as expressed in her Will." R. at 566.
What the Appellant really seems to quibble with is the District Court's finding of a duty
in the first instance that encompasses non-probate property, not any "conflation" of the duty of
care and the standard of care. The distinction between the duty of care and the standard of care,
and the Distract Court's understanding, is evident in part from the District Court's finding that it
is "painfully obvious from the facts of this case that in preparing the 2012 Deed, Mr. Wise was
acting under a conflict of interest." R. at 564. Necessarily, where a duty exists, it is a departure
from the standard of care for an attorney to engage in a conflict of interest transaction. See,
I.R.P.C. 1.7 and 1.9(a). This was just one way in which the District Court found Mr. Wise to
have departed from the applicable standard of care and thereby breached his duty to Billy Jr.
An attorney is held to the standard of care expected of an attorney, which is to comply
with the local standard of care. Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 617, 621, 272 P.3d 1247, 1252
(2012). The relevant standard of care is generally predicated upon expert testimony because
"laypeople sitting on a jury usually do not have the knowledge or experience necessary to
determine the standard of care that applies to an attorney ... " Greenfield v. Smith, 162 Idaho 246,
252, 395 P.3d 1279, 1285 (2017). "[T]he contours of the duties owed by an attorney to his or her
client are defined by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct." Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho
617, 620, 272 P.3d 1247, 1251 (2012). "While the rules of professional conduct cannot be used
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as a basis to impose civil liability, see I.R.C.P., Scope, ,-r 20, they are informative of the standard
of care that an attorney owes to his or her client. See Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 705, 652
P.2d 650, 653 (1982) (using professional responsibility rules to identify the standard of care
owed by an attorney acting under a conflict of interest)." Stephen v. Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd.,
150 Idaho 521, 526 n.3, 248 P.3d 1256, 1261 (2011).
In relying on expert testimony, and Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7, 1.9 and 4.3,
and analyzing the facts of this cases vis-a-vis said expert testimony and Rules, the District Court
found that it was "painfully obvious" that Mr. Wise prepared the 2012 Deed under a conflict of
interest. R. at 564. Specifically, "in contravention of Rule 1.9(a), Mr. Wise, who had represented
Carolyn in the perpetration of the 2002 Deed, subsequently represented Brent, individually, in
the preparation of a 2012 Deed that effectively rescinded Carolyn's intended disposition of the
remainder interest in the 2002 Deed." R. at 564-565.
The District Court also found, "in contravention of Rule l.7(a)(2), Mr. Wise prepared the
2012 Deed despite the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest" based upon Mr. Wise's
representation of and responsibilities to Brent individually, representation of and responsibilities
to Brent as personal representative of Carolyn's estate, and representation of and responsibilities
to his former client Carolyn and his resulting duty to her beneficiaries Billy Jr. and Brent. R. at
565.
Finally, the District Court found Mr. Wise's knowing preparation and transmittal of the
2012 Deed to Billy Jr. and accompanying transmittal letter was in contravention of I.R.P.C. 4.3
because Mr. Wise failed to advise Billy Jr., an unrepresented person, to obtain independent
counsel. R. at 565.
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While not found to be the proximate cause of Billy Jr. 's damages, it should also be noted
that the District Court found Mr. Wise to have violated I.R.P.C. 1. 1 in preparing Carolyn's Will
and thereby breached his duty of care to Billy Jr. In this regard, Rule 1.1 provides that a "lawyer
shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."
I.R.P .C. 1.1. "To be adequately prepared and thorough, the attorney must make 'inquiry into and
analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem."' Stephen v. Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd.,
150 Idaho 521, 526, 248 P.3d 1256, 1261 (2011). "[T]he most fundamental legal skill consists
of determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that necessarily
transcends any particular specialized knowledge." I.R.P.C. 1.1, Commentary [2]; see also,
Stephen v. Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., 150 Idaho 521, 526 (2011)(to be adequately prepared and

thorough, the attorney must make inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of
the problem).
In recognizing Mr. Wise's violation of Rule 1.1, the District Court stated the following:
It cannot be emphasized enough that at the time he prepared the
Will and 2002 Deed, Mr. Wise knew that Billy was an adult, was
at least physically disabled, was unable to work, and was living
with his mother. He learned this information during approximately
eight to ten meetings with Carolyn. The identification of Billy's
personal property was also a recurring topic in the divorce
pleadings drafted by Mr. Wise. Despite all of this information, Mr.
Wise did not ask Carolyn for more elaboration on Billy's
condition .... I other words, he failed to make the minimum factual
or legal inquiries that are consistent with the local standard of care
in the First Judicial District.

R. at 573. (emphasis added). The consequence of this was "Mr. Wise "did not understand the
implications of the type of trust he created in the Will to Billy's current or future eligibility for
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public benefits ... the effects of Mr. Wise's incompetence cannot be reversed without additional
damage to Billy." Id.
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Wise's breach of the applicable standard of care cannot be
reasonably contested.

E.

BILLY JR.'S DAMAGES WERE PROXIMATELY CAUSE BY CRAIG WISE'S BREACH.

In arguing that Mr. Wise did not proximately cause Billy Jr.' s damages, the Appellant
curiously argues that no evidence was presented at trial that Billy did not receive in trust his half
of Carolyn's estate. App. Brief at 35. First, a review of conservator David Kalb's trial testimony
reveals that this assertion is entirely untrue. David Kalb testified on the precise issue at trial as
follows:

Q.
A.
Q.

A.

. .. what is your understanding of what Billy has
received from Caroline Kaiser's [sic] estate?
To my understanding he hasn't received anything
basically from the estate.
Do you know that - so nothing has been received
from the estate - do you know if some of those
underlying structures like a trust or things of that
nature have been established for Billy?
Nothing has been established ...

Trial Tr. at 29-30. Clearly, evidence was presented at trial that Billy Jr. did not receive in trust
his half of Carolyn's estate.
Second, whether Billy Jr. has received anything "in trust" in not germane to whether Mr.
Wise proximately caused Billy Jr. 's damages, since the subject property was not received in trust
before it was deeded away by Mr. Wise.

Finally, and ironically, it was Mr. Wise's

"incompetence" in failing to provide for an appropriate trust or even to make the "minimum
factual or legal inquiries" in preparing Carolyn's Will in the first place that amounted to a breach
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of his duty to Billy Jr. R. at 573. In this regard, it can be argued that, but for Mr. Wise's failure
to competently provide for an appropriate trust in Carolyn's Will, the subject property would
have been received in trust upon Carolyn's death, and Billy Jr. would have received his interest
in his mother's estate as intended.
What the District Court did unambiguously find, by a preponderance of the evidence, is
that "but for the preparation of the 2012 Deed by Mr. Wise, Billy's one-half interest in the
property would not have been conveyed to Brent." R. at 566. Necessarily, if Billy's one-half
interest in the property would not have been conveyed to Brent, the subject property would still
be titled in Billy Jr., as tenants in common with Brent Kyser.
For these reasons, Mr. Wise proximately caused Billy Jr's damages.

V.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the District Court's Judgment should be affirmed.

DATED this 24th day of January, 2020.
LAKE CITY LAW GROUP, PLLC

By: Isl Jason S. Wing
JASON S. WING

Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
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